

The Communist Indicator

A Measure of the Historical Balance of Forces Toward Communism

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Abstract

This article introduces the *Communist Indicator* as a measure of the historical balance of forces between capital and anticapital and, in this sense, as an indicator of movement toward communism. At each year t , the indicator is defined as $K_t = A_t/C_t$, where A_t is the sum of GDP PPP of all entities classified as anticapital in year t and C_t is the sum of GDP PPP of all entities classified as capital in year t . Using Maddison Project data and a rule-based classification of countries and historical entities, the article constructs a yearly series for 1914–2022. The results show a long-term rise of the indicator, interrupted by the post-Soviet decline and followed by renewed growth in the twenty-first century. The final working estimate for 2022 is $K_{2022} = 0.581$, or 58.1%.

Keywords: communist indicator; capitalism; capital; anticapitalism; imperialism; socialism; historical measurement; PPP GDP; balance of forces; comparative economic systems

JEL Codes: B51; P16; P21; P27; P51

1. Introduction

In the modern world, there exists a broad Marxist and anticapitalist movement. I do not claim that the article I am writing here will satisfy everyone in full, but I believe that what is presented in this work may still be useful to Marxists, communists, socialists, anticapitalists, anti-imperialists, anti-colonial thinkers, anti-Western forces, national liberation movements, revolutionary nationalists, Third Worldists, and, more generally, to all those who stand against the imperialist order in one form or another. The world is structured in such a way that it appears to be moving somewhere, perhaps toward communism. Communism here means a classless, stateless, moneyless, marketless, and even planless society: a world whole, a world of synthesis. The problem, however, is that we do not know how to measure this movement. How can we say whether we have actually come closer?

I believe I can offer an answer to this question. The problem, however, is that the basis from which I derive this indicator is not yet known to you. It is not known to you because the theoretical framework from which it emerges—*Polar Marxism*, or *Polar Capitalism*—remains unfamiliar to most readers. You do not yet fully know what it is, what it argues, or why this indicator follows from it and works in the way I claim it does. You may disagree with me, and you may dispute particular points. But in order to show that there is indeed a real movement, and that what I am saying has explanatory power, I must begin by presenting the result itself. Everything else will be shown later. In this sense, I begin from the end.

In this work, I present the so-called *Communist Indicator*. This indicator does two things, briefly speaking. First, it shows the balance of forces between the two poles of the world: the capitalist and

the anticapitalist or, more briefly, what I simply call capital and anticapital, which are historically expressed in the way we will see later. Second, it shows how close we are to communism. Its logic is simple: it begins at zero and moves toward one. At the moment it reaches one, communism should arrive. In this article, $K = 1$ is treated as the theoretical threshold of parity between the two poles. But all of this will be explained later.

The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, I define the Communist Indicator as a concept. In Section 3, I clarify what is meant by capital and anticapital. In Section 4, I present the formal definition of the indicator. In Section 5, I explain the historical entities and units of analysis used in the study. In Section 6, I set out the rules of classification and marking. In Section 7, I describe the data, sources, and the construction of the dataset. In Section 8, I provide preliminary historical estimates of the indicator. Finally, in Sections 9 and 10, I interpret its movement, discuss its limits, and indicate directions for further development.

2. The Communist Indicator as a Concept

We will not examine here how we arrived at this concept, because this work is not about that. Its purpose is rather to approximately calculate the *Communist Indicator* and present it to the reader. What, then, is the *Communist Indicator*? At a given year t , the *Communist Indicator* is the ratio $K_t = A_t/C_t$, that is, the ratio of the power of *anticapital* to that of *capital* in year t . If we look at the world, it consists, as it were, of two poles.

The point is that these poles are distributed unevenly: one pole is stronger than the other, but over time the second pole tends to move closer to the first. It continues to catch up with it. This process of one pole catching up with the other is what, so to speak, constitutes the movement of the *Communist Indicator* toward one. The closer the power of one pole is to that of the other, the closer the *Communist Indicator* is to one.

Why, then, is this indicator an indicator of movement toward communism, and why is its limit one? I will give a simple explanation. The point is that as soon as one pole is able to catch up with the other, the world will become levelled in terms of the difference between them. This will lead to a situation in which the capitalist part of the world, *capital*, will no longer be able to reproduce itself, because it will simply become uncompetitive. It will no longer be able to compete, and for that reason it will no longer be able to exist. In my view, *capital* requires a periphery; without it, *capital* neither exists nor reproduces itself.

Accordingly, at the moment when the second, *anticapitalist* pole, which encompasses the periphery, reaches the same level of development as the capitalist pole itself, *capital* can no longer remain competitive, and all the laws of *capital* will automatically wither away. This will also lead to the disappearance of the second pole, because the second pole is the opposite of the first and appears precisely as a response to it. It will wither away together with it. This equality will be reached at the moment when the productive forces of human society attain a communist level. The world will continue to develop, and, whether in twenty, thirty, or fifty years, it may reach a point at which development becomes sufficient for the transition to a post-class society.

The indicator reaches one because, in essence, K_t is the ratio A_t/C_t , that is, the ratio of the force of *anticapital* to that of *capital* in year t . As long as *anticapital* remains weaker than *capital*, it will stay below one. But the closer it comes in strength to *capital*, the closer it comes to one. At the moment

when it becomes equal to one, the two poles will have reached parity, and from that point the transition to communism will occur. I call this transition a *revolution of the second type*. But that lies further ahead. Here, we are concerned only with the *Communist Indicator* itself.

3. Capital and Anticapital: Definitions

We must now clarify what is meant by *capital* and *anticapital*, because one might think that when I speak of *capital*, I mean the market, the accumulation of money, and things of that sort, although such things may also exist in countries of *anticapital*. And what, then, is *anticapital* itself? For that is an even less clear category.

By *capital*, I mean the totality of the developed Western world and everything subordinated to it, everything that belongs to its sphere of influence. *Capital* can be described in different ways so that an intuitive sense of it may emerge. We may describe it as the United States, Europe, the developed world, the so-called golden billion, the West, imperialism and, so to speak, its colonies and dependent territories. It is the West and all those who stand with the West; it is imperialism and all those who stand with imperialism, and so on. I intentionally do not provide an exact definition here, because that itself would require a more precise discussion later. For the purposes of this work, however, such a definition is sufficient.

What, then, is *anticapital*? *Anticapital* is precisely that which stands in opposition to *capital*. It is everything socialist, anticapitalist, anti-Western, anti-imperialist, and so on. It moves against it. It is everything that does not support the West, everything that stands against it, and this is something we can observe historically. It may take different forms. It may be the Soviet Union, it may be China, it may be anticolonial movements in particular countries in the past, and so on. It may be many different things. In other words, these are countries and forces that stand against the West. Thus, the world is divided into two poles: one is pro-Western, and this is *capital*; the other is anti-Western, and this is *anticapital*. It is the power of these two poles that we will measure, because countries often pass from one camp to another, and they constantly fluctuate. This makes the calculation difficult, and in some cases it may be controversial. But in general, these are the two sides of the world that constitute the *Communist Indicator*.

4. Formal Definition of the Indicator

Defining the *Communist Indicator* more formally, we may write it in the following way. Since it is a yearly ratio, it can be expressed by the following formulas:

$$K_t = \frac{A_t}{C_t} \quad (4.1)$$

$$A_t = \sum_{i \in \text{anticapital}} GDP_{i,t}^{PPP} \quad (4.2)$$

$$C_t = \sum_{i \in \text{capital}} GDP_{i,t}^{PPP} \quad (4.3)$$

where K_t denotes the *Communist Indicator* in year t , A_t denotes the total GDP at purchasing power parity of all entities classified as *anticapital* in year t , and C_t denotes the total GDP at purchasing power parity of all entities classified as *capital* in year t .

In truth, I am not entirely certain which exact measure should be preferred in the final sense, but in this work, and for the time being, I use GDP PPP because it is among the easiest to calculate, broadly adequate, and genuinely expressive of objective power, real productivity, reproductive capacity, and so on. It captures the extent to which this GDP can be transformed into anything else, whether military power, science, or other forms of material capacity. Accordingly, it is best to use GDP at purchasing power parity, because it most fully expresses the real power of states, countries, and regions. As I have said, it is not the most perfect measure, but it is the best one we can use at present, and it is the one I will use here.

5. Historical Entities and Units of Analysis

The *Communist Indicator* will be calculated not only for the present moment, but over a long historical period, beginning with the time of the First World War. I state immediately that before the First World War the *Communist Indicator* is equal to zero, because there was no *anticapitalist* movement as such. What existed then was so-called pure capitalism, which had reached its highest form of development, so to speak. This was ultimately expressed in war, but that does not concern us here.

The point is that we will calculate the indicator from that period onward, but since the world changed constantly, countries disappeared and emerged, some countries passed from one camp into another, and so on, and the world as a whole moved, conditionally speaking, toward liberation under the action of *anticapitalist* forces, the world itself was constantly changing. For this reason, we will not simply take modern countries as they are now, but *historical entities*, and we will examine them year by year, calculating their GDP and then, on that basis, calculating the indicator itself.

By a *historical entity*, we simply mean a concrete political form existing on a given territory in a given year. For example, if in 1990 there was the Soviet Union, then we call it the Soviet Union, taking into account all of its territories. If in 1999 there was the Russian Federation, together with other separate states, then we take them separately, and so on. This does not change the basic logic, because in any case we will later assign them to one of the two poles: either the pole of *capital* or the pole of *anticapital*. The main point is that in each year we take the actually existing map, that is, what is concretely present on the map at that moment.

6. Rules of Classification and Marking

In this chapter I will make one final methodological remark. When I classify *historical entities*, as I have already said, I will look primarily at whether a given entity is pro-Western or anti-Western, broadly speaking, and classify it accordingly. Once again, as I have said, this may often be controversial, but at present this is a sufficiently effective heuristic approach. At the present stage, this classification is used as a working heuristic that is sufficiently consistent for the purposes of the indicator. There are other criteria by which *anticapitalism* may be defined, and so on. The point, however, is that the world is complex, but the division into these two parts, and the corresponding assignment of entities

to them, is sufficiently accurate for the purposes of this work and for the calculation of the *Communist Indicator*, even though I do not claim that it is a final or absolutely complete solution.

In operational terms, the present classification relies on a core bibliography for the main blocs used in the article. The socialist core and the East European socialist bloc are treated on the basis of the standard historical literature on the socialist camp (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2026c,d,e,f,j,l,m,n,o,s,v,w,y). The Arab anti-imperialist and Ba'athist cases are treated through the corresponding historical literature on Nasserism, Ba'athism, and related anti-imperialist state formations (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2026b,g,r,t,u). The post-1979 Iranian case is treated separately as part of the broader anti-Western and anti-imperialist pole (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2026q). Anti-colonial and revolutionary regimes in Africa and adjacent zones are treated through the relevant country histories (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2026a,h,i,k). Anti-imperialist and Bolivarian currents in Latin America are treated through the corresponding historical literature (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2026p,x). The contemporary BRICS-centered pole is treated through both official BRICS materials and the recent academic literature on BRICS as a potentially counter-hegemonic bloc (BRICS Brasil 2025; Papa et al. 2023).

At the same time, trade or the market does not matter here. If we take some country, for example the contemporary Russian Federation, which may appear to be a market democracy, but in fact has a very large share of state companies in its economy and a clear *anticapitalist* orientation, then even if it trades with the West or with Europe, this does not in itself make it capitalist. It may still remain *anticapitalist*, depending on the period. The point is that trade, the market, and the typical way in which people imagine socialism or *anticapitalist* countries—for example as purely planned systems or something of that kind—differs somewhat from the way I understand these categories in my own framework.

7. Data, Sources, and Dataset Construction

The empirical basis of this study is the Maddison Project historical GDP dataset (Bolt and Zanden 2024, 2025), which provides the yearly series used for the construction of the indicator. The unit of observation is the country or historical entity in a given year.

Former composite entities such as the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia are handled through explicit historical rules. The full classification tables and supplementary tabulations are collected in Section A. For each year, every entity is assigned to one of two poles: capital or anticapital.

The force of each pole is measured through GDP at purchasing power parity, and the yearly totals are aggregated into the Communist Indicator.

A small number of technical adjustments were introduced where the source data produced artificial gaps, most notably for the wartime USSR interval.

The final output is a yearly series of the Communist Indicator for 1914–2022 together with its classification structure.

8. Preliminary Historical Estimates

The final yearly series covers the period from 1914 to 2022.

In the early period, the indicator remains at or near zero. It then begins to rise with the emergence and expansion of the anticapitalist pole. The postwar period produces a much stronger increase. The




Figure 1: The Communist Indicator in percent, 1914–2022.

1990s produce a major decline. The 2000s and 2010s produce a new rise. In the most recent period, the indicator continues to grow and reaches its current high point.

Table 1: Recent values of the Communist Indicator, 2013–2022.

year	A	C	K	K_percent
2013	34135709250	72086092082	0.47	47.35
2014	36067992133	73733899320	0.49	48.92
2015	37619324392	75562548083	0.50	49.79
2016	39516219705	77257496854	0.51	51.15
2017	41578748509	79485930040	0.52	52.31
2018	43813416100	81707689866	0.54	53.62
2019	45692594438	83402619133	0.55	54.79
2020	45197186289	80140415317	0.56	56.40
2021	48678917333	84451742437	0.58	57.64
2022	50361102635	86739231031	0.58	58.06

The final working estimate for 2022 is $K_{2022} = 0.581$, or 58.1%.

9. Interpreting the Movement of the Indicator

The historical movement of the indicator reflects the changing balance of force between capital and anticapital. Its first major rise follows the emergence of the Soviet center and the expansion of the socialist camp. Its second major rise follows the consolidation of the broader anti-Western pole in the postwar world.

Table 2: Selected benchmark years for the Communist Indicator.

year	A	C	K	K_percent
1914	0	3092014836	0.00	0.00
1920	141774619	3423211103	0.04	4.14
1930	402081296	5055977644	0.08	7.95
1940	669629490	5364024525	0.12	12.48
1945	553455832	5516514526	0.10	10.03
1950	1542445001	7224779010	0.21	21.35
1960	2667491227	11357876229	0.23	23.49
1970	4398788264	18872315471	0.23	23.31
1980	6615721218	28489589495	0.23	23.22
1990	8002461137	38712695758	0.21	20.67
2000	12955700160	49840355256	0.26	25.99
2010	29122142863	66317169918	0.44	43.91
2020	45197186289	80140415317	0.56	56.40
2021	48678917333	84451742437	0.58	57.64
2022	50361102635	86739231031	0.58	58.06

Its major decline follows the destruction of the Soviet center and the restructuring of the world order in the 1990s. Its new rise in the twenty-first century reflects the growth of the contemporary anti-Western bloc, above all the BRICS-centered pole (BRICS Brasil 2025; Papa et al. 2023).

In this sense, the indicator does not move randomly, but follows the historical reconfiguration of the two world poles. The final value for 2022 suggests that the anticapitalist pole has already reached a substantial share of world material force.

9.1. Development, Periphery, and the Author's Theoretical Position

What matters for my theory is not who declares himself communist, who speaks in the name of justice, or who claims to stand for all that is good. What matters is development itself and the real structure of the world process behind appearances.

The world is structured through the relation between center and periphery, or, more precisely, through imperialism and its periphery. This division is not digital or mechanically binary, but continuous and historical. Yet one principle remains decisive: pure capitalism cannot develop the periphery. It necessarily reproduces unevenness, dependence, and poverty at the edge of the system. For this reason, the very fact that the periphery develops in the modern world is already a good in itself.

This is the key point. The fact that the periphery catches up with the center, the fact that we speak of catch-up development, and the fact that formerly subordinate countries rise materially are already historically significant. Even if someone were to prove that China, BRICS, or the broader non-Western bloc are merely another form of capitalism, that would not change my basic position: development remains a good.

At the same time, my argument is that this development is not generated by pure capitalism itself. It is generated by the historical struggle against it. The people of the periphery did not rise because of




Figure 2: The Communist Indicator in percent, 1990–2022.

abstract inequality alone, but because they lived badly, because they were constrained, subordinated, and blocked from development. In this sense, inequality must not be understood in a merely formal way, but in an absolute historical way: as degradation, non-development, and enforced inferiority in relation to the center.

I will further argue that the modern world, including BRICS, is deeply anti-capitalist in structure, and that the key to understanding this modern anti-capitalism is China. Only then does appearance give way to reality. What seems at first glance to be one thing may in fact be its opposite. This is simply a return to materialism: behind appearance stands reality, and that reality, I will argue, is anti-capitalist.

My basic position, however, does not depend entirely on whether others accept this conclusion. Even if one insisted that the present world is still entirely capitalist, the central fact would remain that the world is developing, and that this development is good. My further claim is that the development of the world after the end of pure capitalism has been tied to an anti-capitalist system whose center, in historical terms, has been socialism: first the Soviet Union, now China, and in the future perhaps some other center.

Imperialism cannot exist without a periphery. It necessarily produces one. But the periphery rises, turns into anti-capitalism, and gathers around a center. This anti-capitalist periphery, together with its center, struggles against imperialism, and through that struggle it develops. In this way, the non-Western pole catches up with the West. While the West continues to move forward, the East, or the Global South more broadly, catches up at an accelerated pace.

For this reason, modern catch-up development, the rise of developing countries, and the material advance of the periphery must be understood as effects of anti-capitalism rather than of capitalism itself. Pure capitalism cannot produce this outcome.

From this follows the final conclusion: if capitalism reaches the point where it no longer has a periphery — that is, if anti-capitalism develops the periphery to the point where the Communist

Indicator reaches one — then capitalism will lose the condition of its own reproduction. Capital requires a periphery. Without it, it cannot reproduce itself.

At that point, imperialism would collapse because firms located in the former periphery would be able to do everything the Western firm does, only better and more cheaply, and on a general scale. Western firms would cease to be competitive. The result would be bankruptcy and systemic collapse. This is a simple thought, but it can be developed theoretically, and it should be developed further.

10. Limits of the Measure and Further Development

The measure is limited by the structure and coverage of the historical GDP data on which it is built (Bolt and Zanden 2024, 2025).

Some historical entities are affected by incomplete or uneven source coverage. Former composite entities such as the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia also require explicit historical handling. A small number of technical adjustments were therefore necessary in order to remove artificial gaps from the yearly series.

The classification itself also remains theory-dependent, since the boundary between capital and anticapital is defined within a specific historical framework. For this reason, the indicator should be understood as a reproducible first model. Its further development may include finer country classification, improved historical reconstruction, and additional decomposition of the forces driving its movement.

11. Related Measures and the Position of the Communist Indicator

There are already measures that capture particular sides of the same historical movement measured here by the *Communist Indicator*:

- UN voting measures capture the foreign-policy position of states in relation to the US-led liberal order, and in this sense they register the political side of anti-Western alignment (Bailey et al. 2017).
- The BRICS Convergence Index captures the degree of policy convergence inside BRICS, and in this sense it measures the consolidation of a contemporary counter-hegemonic bloc (Papa et al. 2023).
- World-systems measures of core and periphery capture the structure of global hierarchy, the persistence of asymmetry, and the limited but real upward movement of some non-core states (Clark and Beckfield 2009; Jacinto 2023; Zhao 2021).
- Capability measures such as CINC capture the material balance of force through a wider set of power variables, but they still aim at the same general question of how much force is concentrated on one side of the world system and how much on the other (Correlates of War Project 2024; Singer 1988; Singer et al. 1972).

For this reason, these measures are not identical to the *Communist Indicator*, but they are clearly related to it. Each of them measures one aspect of the same process that the *Communist Indicator* attempts to grasp in a more unified form:

- UN voting measures the political orientation of states (Bailey et al. 2017).

- The BRICS index measures counter-hegemonic convergence (Papa et al. 2023).
- World-systems measures track structural inequality and the movement of the global hierarchy (Clark and Beckfield 2009; Jacinto 2023; Zhao 2021).
- Capability indices measure the balance of material strength (Correlates of War Project 2024; Singer 1988; Singer et al. 1972).

Thus, if we look at these measures, and if we examine them carefully, we can see that in essence they show almost the same underlying reality, but from different sides. They themselves may not fully understand that they are speaking about one and the same process. When we speak of the growth of non-Western forces, for me this is precisely anticapitalism, the approach to communism, or something of that kind. When we speak of the growth of anti-Western sentiment, this is directly connected to the growth of anti-Western forces as a whole. Material growth is connected with ideological growth. The more we see the development of these countries, the more we also see criticism of the West. These things are interconnected, because they are all part of one and the same anticapitalist process.

The point, then, is that although the *Communist Indicator*, as calculated in this chapter, is not perfect, its essence is fundamental. The *Communist Indicator* itself, in substance, conveys exactly this process that we observe when we look at the different indicators. All of those different indicators merely reveal particular aspects of the wider world-historical process that is taking place.

What is striking is that the practical description of the contemporary world is already visible to everyone, even if it is rarely named directly. There is an alternative to the West. In the past, that alternative was represented above all by the Soviet Union. Today the world has changed, and the rhetoric has changed with it, but the basic structure has not changed. There is still an alternative to the West. The center has shifted, but it remains the same broader historical process of the non-Western world, above all of the periphery resisting Western domination.

Of course, smaller countries may shift from one side to another, and borderline cases may remain debatable. But this does not alter the essence of the indicator. Reassigning minor states would not change the general result in any serious way. To move a major country such as China, India, or Russia into the Western camp would require a historically implausible reinterpretation. Such countries do not simply become Western in any meaningful historical sense. They could collapse, be subordinated, or be turned into a more direct object of Western extraction, but that is a different matter. As such, it is not realistic to treat them as naturally belonging to the Western pole.

This is precisely what the Communist Indicator helps reveal. Since the emergence of the Soviet Union, colonialism has steadily weakened. This decline of colonial domination is not accidental. It is directly connected to the growth of anticapitalist forces. The reduction of colonialism, the rise of non-Western power, and the movement toward a more equal world are all aspects of the same underlying historical process. In my terms, that process is the movement toward communism.

12. Conclusion

In concluding this work, I have shown that it is in fact possible to construct an objective indicator that genuinely helps to calculate how close we are to communism. Some aspects may remain controversial, even within my own framework. Particular countries, for example, may be assigned to one pole or the other. But, in general, this does not matter too much, because even if some assignments were

rearranged, this would not alter the basic substance of the *Communist Indicator*, namely that it rises overall. One could even speak here of a certain law, a law of communism, so to speak. The point is that we are moving toward it.

Why is this so? Because the world develops and becomes levelled at the same time. This development and equalization of the world is, in essence, what the *Communist Indicator* expresses, and this at the same time signifies movement toward communism.

At the same time, it must be stressed that even if my interpretation of the *Communist Indicator* remains controversial, the very fact of calculating the balance of forces between two poles still has significance. This remains true even if different scholars interpret those poles differently. Some may say that this was truly capitalism and the socialist bloc; others may say that it is capitalism and another capitalism, only an authoritarian one, conditionally speaking. Interpret it as you wish. The point is that such a ratio still has analytical meaning even independently of my own conclusions.

Returning to the results themselves, what I specifically did was calculate the *Communist Indicator* for the historical period from 1914 to 2022, because this is the period that I was able to obtain from Maddison in an adequate form. As a result, for the year 2022 I obtain this indicator at the level of 58.1%. Again, this precise figure may itself be disputable, but the value lies within some range around it. It may, of course, in the future be specified differently, but the main point is that it is already rather high in comparison with the past.

At the same time, 58% does not mean that communism has been achieved in some particular country or place. No. What it means, in essence, is that the world as a whole has developed to 58% of the communist level, so to speak, and has reached equality (between countries and regions) to 58% of the communist level. Once it reaches 100%, both development and equality will have attained the level that gives rise to the revolution of the second type.

It should also be noted that the indicator does not move chaotically, but in a fully historical way. First of all, it is connected with the rise of the Soviet center. Once it appeared, it became the center of this anticapitalist world and, in general, gave birth to it. In other words, the anticapitalist movement across the world as a whole began with the Soviet Union.

There were, of course, moments when it declined, for example during the Second World War or after the collapse of the Soviet Union. But in general it always rises. It is only such world-historical events as major wars or the collapse of previous centers that seriously shake it. The new center, incidentally, is China. These events may disturb the movement of the indicator, and there may be other processes that also cause fluctuations, but in most cases it moves upward.

Although this work does not claim to settle the question definitively, it is correct to say that it offers a very strong formulation of the problem and a clear indication of further research. Nevertheless, the main value of this work lies in the fact that it introduces, for the first time, a measure of proximity to communism. It is a first model for measuring the historical movement toward communism, that is, for measuring whether we are in fact approaching it. This constitutes both its novelty and its principal strength, and I hope that readers will recognize it as such.

A. Supplementary Tables

This appendix collects the detailed tables used in the construction of the *Communist Indicator* and the supplementary tabulations referenced in the main text.

Table A.1: Wartime segment of the Communist Indicator, 1938–1946.

year	A	C	K	K_percent
1938	645982646	5623666723	0.11	11.49
1939	686023514	5257126227	0.13	13.05
1940	669629490	5364024525	0.12	12.48
1941	646394758	5616296627	0.12	11.51
1942	623160027	5685375445	0.11	10.96
1943	599925295	5848654829	0.10	10.26
1944	576690563	5921553828	0.10	9.74
1945	553455832	5516514526	0.10	10.03
1946	530221100	5234774799	0.10	10.13

Table A.2 reports realized anticapitalist periods in the final yearly panel, while Table A.3 reports the underlying classification rules used to construct that panel.

Table A.2: Anticapitalist periods by country/entity in the final model.

coun-trycode	country	label	block	start_year	end_year
AFG	Afghanistan	1	2	1978	1992
ALB	Albania	1	2	1950	1991
DZA	Algeria	1	2	1962	2022
AGO	Angola	1	2	1975	1991
ARM	Armenia	1	3	1991	2022
AZE	Azerbaijan	1	3	1991	2022
BLR	Belarus	1	3	1991	2022
BOL	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	1	2	2006	2022
BIH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1	2	1995	2022
BRA	Brazil	1	2	2003	2022
BGR	Bulgaria	1	3	1948	1989
KHM	Cambodia	1	2	1975	1989
CHN	China	1	2	1950	2022
CUB	Cuba	1	2	1959	2022
CSK	Czechoslovakia	1	2	1948	1992
PRK	D.P.R. of Korea	1	1	1990	2022
EGY	Egypt	1	2	1952	1978
ETH	Ethiopia	1	2	1974	1991
SUN	Former USSR	1	1	1920	1991
YUG	Former Yugoslavia	1	2	1947	1992

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Table A.2: Anticapitalist periods by country/entity in the final model. (Continued)

countrycode	country	label	block	start_year	end_year
GEO	Georgia	1	3	1991	2003
HUN	Hungary	1	4	1949	1989
IND	India	1	2	2000	2022
IRN	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	1	2	1979	2022
IRQ	Iraq	1	2	1958	2003
KAZ	Kazakhstan	1	3	1991	2022
KGZ	Kyrgyzstan	1	3	1991	2022
LAO	Lao People's DR	1	2	1975	2022
LBY	Libya	1	2	1969	2011
MNG	Mongolia	1	1	1950	1991
MNE	Montenegro	1	2	2006	2022
MOZ	Mozambique	1	2	1975	1992
MMR	Myanmar	1	2	1962	1988
NIC	Nicaragua	1	2	1979	1990
NIC	Nicaragua	1	4	2007	2022
POL	Poland	1	3	1948	1989
MDA	Republic of Moldova	1	3	1991	2022
ROU	Romania	1	3	1947	1989
RUS	Russian Federation	1	2	1991	2022
SRB	Serbia	1	2	1991	2022
ZAF	South Africa	1	2	1994	2023
PSE	State of Palestine	1	2	1988	2022
SDN	Sudan (Former)	1	2	1969	1985
SYR	Syrian Arab Republic	1	2	1963	2022
MKD	TFYR of Macedonia	1	2	1991	2022
TJK	Tajikistan	1	3	1991	2022
TKM	Turkmenistan	1	3	1991	2022
UZB	Uzbekistan	1	3	1991	2022
VEN	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	1	2	1999	2022
VNM	Viet Nam	1	2	1954	2022
YEM	Yemen	1	2	1967	1990
YEM	Yemen	1	4	2014	2022

Table A.3: Final classification rules used in the Communist Indicator.

countrycode	country	start_year	end_year	label	note
AFG	Afghanistan	1978	1992	1	anti-imperialist period
ALB	Albania	1946	1991	1	socialist state
DZA	Algeria	1962	2022	1	anti-colonial / anti-western state
AGO	Angola	1975	1991	1	anti-imperialist period
ARM	Armenia	1991	2022	1	post-soviet anti-western bloc
AUS	Australia	1914	2022	0	western core
AUT	Austria	1914	2022	0	western core
AZE	Azerbaijan	1991	2022	1	post-soviet anti-western bloc
BLR	Belarus	1991	2022	1	modern anti-western bloc
BEL	Belgium	1914	2022	0	western core
BOL	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	2006	2022	1	anti-western period
BIH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1995	2022	1	post-yugoslav anti-western space
BRA	Brazil	2003	2022	1	BRICS / Global South anti-western scenario
BGR	Bulgaria	1946	1989	1	socialist bloc
KHM	Cambodia	1975	1989	1	revolutionary / anti-western period
CAN	Canada	1914	2022	0	western core
CHN	China	1949	2022	1	chinese center
CUB	Cuba	1959	2022	1	socialist state
CSK	Czechoslovakia	1948	1992	1	socialist bloc
PRK	D.P.R. of Korea	1948	2022	1	socialist state
DNK	Denmark	1914	2022	0	western core
EGY	Egypt	1952	1978	1	nasserist anti-imperialist period
ETH	Ethiopia	1974	1991	1	anti-imperialist period
FIN	Finland	1914	2022	0	western core
SUN	Former USSR	1920	1991	1	soviet center
YUG	Former Yugoslavia	1945	1992	1	socialist / anti-western bloc
FRA	France	1914	2022	0	western core
GEO	Georgia	1991	2003	1	post-soviet anti-western period
GRC	Greece	1914	2022	0	western core

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Table A.3: Final classification rules used in the Communist Indicator. (Continued)

countrycode	country	start_year	end_year	label	note
HUN	Hungary	1949	1989	1	socialist bloc
ISL	Iceland	1914	2022	0	western core
IND	India	2000	2022	1	BRICS / Global South anti-western scenario
IRN	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	1979	2022	1	anti-western / anti-imperialist
IRQ	Iraq	1958	2003	1	anti-western / anti-imperialist period
IRL	Ireland	1914	2022	0	western core
ISR	Israel	1914	2022	0	western-aligned
ITA	Italy	1914	2022	0	western core
JPN	Japan	1914	2022	0	western-aligned core
KAZ	Kazakhstan	1991	2022	1	post-soviet anti-western bloc
KGZ	Kyrgyzstan	1991	2022	1	post-soviet anti-western bloc
LAO	Lao People's DR	1975	2022	1	socialist state
LBY	Libya	1969	2011	1	anti-imperialist period
LUX	Luxembourg	1914	2022	0	western core
MNG	Mongolia	1924	1991	1	socialist state
MNE	Montenegro	2006	2022	1	post-yugoslav anti-western space
MOZ	Mozambique	1975	1992	1	anti-imperialist period
MMR	Myanmar	1962	1988	1	anti-western nationalist period
NLD	Netherlands	1914	2022	0	western core
NZL	New Zealand	1914	2022	0	western core
NIC	Nicaragua	1979	1990	1	anti-imperialist period
NIC	Nicaragua	2007	2022	1	anti-imperialist period
NOR	Norway	1914	2022	0	western core
POL	Poland	1947	1989	1	socialist bloc
PRT	Portugal	1914	2022	0	western core
KOR	Republic of Korea	1914	2022	0	western-aligned
MDA	Republic of Moldova	1991	2022	1	post-soviet anti-western bloc
ROU	Romania	1947	1989	1	socialist bloc
RUS	Russian Federation	1991	2022	1	modern anti-western bloc
SRB	Serbia	1991	2022	1	anti-western bloc

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Table A.3: Final classification rules used in the Communist Indicator. (Continued)

coun-trycode	country	start_year	end_year	label	note
SGP	Singapore	1914	2022	0	western-aligned
ZAF	South Africa	1994	2022	1	BRICS / Global South anti-western scenario
ESP	Spain	1914	2022	0	western core
PSE	State of Palestine	1988	2022	1	anti-colonial / anti-western
SDN	Sudan (Former)	1969	1985	1	anti-imperialist period
SWE	Sweden	1914	2022	0	western core
CHE	Switzerland	1914	2022	0	western core
SYR	Syrian Arab Republic	1963	2022	1	anti-western state
MKD	TFYR of Macedonia	1991	2022	1	post-yugoslav anti-western space
TWN	Taiwan, Province of China	1914	2022	0	western-aligned
TJK	Tajikistan	1991	2022	1	post-soviet anti-western bloc
TKM	Turkmenistan	1991	2022	1	post-soviet anti-western bloc
GBR	United Kingdom	1914	2022	0	western core
USA	United States	1914	2022	0	western core
UZB	Uzbekistan	1991	2022	1	post-soviet anti-western bloc
VEN	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	1999	2022	1	anti-western bloc
VNM	Viet Nam	1954	2022	1	socialist state
YEM	Yemen	1967	1990	1	anti-imperialist period
YEM	Yemen	2014	2022	1	anti-western period

Table A.4: Anticapitalist entities in 2022 ranked by GDP PPP.

coun-trycode	country	region	gdp_ppp
CHN	China	East Asia	26966016685
IND	India	South and South East Asia	10476248822
RUS	Russian Federation	Eastern Europe	3731440854
BRA	Brazil	Latin America	3187412924
IRN	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Middle East and North Africa	1572208980
VNM	Viet Nam	South and South East Asia	833803921
ZAF	South Africa	Sub Saharan Africa	723559346

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Table A.4: Anticapitalist entities in 2022 ranked by GDP PPP. (Continued)

coun-trycode	country	region	gdp_ppp
DZA	Algeria	Middle East and North Africa	595820046
KAZ	Kazakhstan	Eastern Europe	503634041
UZB	Uzbekistan	Eastern Europe	393572459
BLR	Belarus	Eastern Europe	175773802
AZE	Azerbaijan	Eastern Europe	175370559
VEN	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Latin America	149682061
SRB	Serbia	Eastern Europe	116834643
TKM	Turkmenistan	Eastern Europe	97502947
CUB	Cuba	Latin America	84154969
BOL	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Latin America	78165309
YEM	Yemen	Middle East and North Africa	60852996
LAO	Lao People's DR	South and South East Asia	54953906
SYR	Syrian Arab Republic	Middle East and North Africa	52353140
TJK	Tajikistan	Eastern Europe	50544009
BIH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Eastern Europe	47069138
PRK	D.P.R. of Korea	East Asia	40488847
ARM	Armenia	Eastern Europe	39721735
NIC	Nicaragua	Latin America	32764782
KGZ	Kyrgyzstan	Eastern Europe	31703001
MKD	TFYR of Macedonia	Eastern Europe	28770256
PSE	State of Palestine	Middle East and North Africa	24076502
MDA	Republic of Moldova	Eastern Europe	23827555
MNE	Montenegro	Eastern Europe	12774399

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